An important research problem is the incorporation of \declarative" knowledge into an automated theorem prover that can be utilized in the search for a proof. An interesting proposal in this direction is Alan Bundy's approach of using explicit proof plans that encapsulate the general form of a proof and is instantiated into a particular proof for the case at hand. We give some examples that show how a \declarative" highlevel description of a proof can be used to nd proofs of apparently \similiar" theorems by analogy. This \analogical" information is used to select the appropriate axioms from the database so that the theorem can be proved. This information is also used to adjust some options of a resolution theorem prover. In order to get a powerful tool it is necessary to develop an epistemologically appropriate language to describe proofs, for which a large set of examples should be used as a testbed. We present some ideas in this direction.
Introduction
Analogy plays an important rôle in mathematics: a main part of the formation of concepts as well as of general reasoning is done by analogy. Mathematicians know many concepts, theorems, and examples and out of this fund they can invent new concepts, nd new theorems, construct new proofs, and enlarge this fund of examples. George P olya writes in 15] that a proof is not completed once it is found and written down, but then perhaps the most important steps are to analyze the proof and to learn from it for the solution of future problems. Finding the solution of a problem often consists in reformulating it into a problem that is analogous to a solved one. In 16] P olya writes that two systems are analogous, if they agree in clearly de nable relations of their respective parts. As examples he mentions a geometrical analogy, namely a triangle in the plane and a tetrahedron in the space, and an analytical example of determining the sums of in nite series. P olya's ideas are not formalized as his purpose is to teach how to instruct students in mathematics. Instead of a formalization he presents many examples, by means of which a pupil can learn also for other cases. But as pointed out by Allen Newell 14] there is a considerable gap between the advice P olya gives and what can be used directely in a computer system, because -if one wants to use P olya's heuristic -one has to master \wild subproblems" as Newell calls them, that is, it is still a problem to utilize the solution of a \subproblem" to the solution of the proper problem. In the following we consider only some simple aspects of analogy and give examples how the utilization of such analogies can be pro table. We do not give a formalization of analogy, but only present some ideas, how certain aspects might be formalized. In general it seems that \analogy" is a term that stands for many methods and techniques with some common features, just as for example in \machine learning", where almost certainly no single method will be su cient for all its aspects. However we argue that even the simple aspects that are proposed here can lead to drastic improvements when they are appropriately used in an automated theorem prover. Our method of using analogy does not enlarge the possibilities of deduction in principle, but it is helpful in guiding the search for a proof. In addition we give some hints how it might be possible to nd the preconditions that are necessary for the proof of a theorem. Most examples are taken from 5], as the idea to look for analogies in proofs arose in J org Siekmann's project, where many of the theorems of a textbook on automata theory 5] where proved with the help of the MKRP theorem proving system 6, 12]. Many di erent approaches exist to capture certain aspects of analogy:
Pairings of or mappings between the analogous parts Abstraction to a common generalization Relation between the signatures based on a model-theoretical approach Proof plans to nd proofs in a certain domain We are not going to give an overview on all these e orts. We refer to the overview article of Rogers P. Hall 11] . The idea presented in this paper is closely related to proof plans, that is, to describe the proofs abstractely. If a proof has been found the plan should be analyzed and simpli ed. Then { so the hope { this proof plan can be used to nd proofs of similiar theorems. On the importance of abstract description of theorems and proofs see also 8].
Thesis
To nd an analogy depends, just as many other intelligent processes, to a great degree on nding the adequate level of abstraction. When we are searching for an analogy we are taking only certain aspects of the situation into account and are disregarding others. Helmut Thiele 18] uses subsystems of the signature to abstract from unimportant parts of a concept, in other words to neglect those parts that are not necessary when only the two analogous facts are taken into account. The remaining important parts then have to be isomorphic. In some sense this can be seen as an equivalence mapping among models. In mathematics we can follow a similiar simple approach by not telling the system the meaning, that is, the de nition of some concept. For example if we want to consider only the \re exivity" of an equivalence relation, we abstract from \symmetry" and \transitivity". In other words we want to model reasoning of the sort \whatever symmetry and transitivity might be, we can conclude : : :" (see the example below). This method is well known in the eld of automated theorem proving, and is in fact the second \cheat" of Alan Bundy's (originally longer) list in 3, p.88]: { \Feeding to the theorem prover only those axioms known to be required in the proof. Irrelevant axioms can dramatically increase the size of the search tree." { \Generating only that part of the search tree which lies within some arbitrary limits, but which is known to include the proof. Typically, the sought proof is examined to see: how long it is; what the maximum depth of function nesting is and what the maximum length of clauses is: and then the tree is only searched within those limits."
We give examples how \analogy" can help at least in some cases to automate the nding of those clauses that are necessary to derive a theorem and to automatically adjust some \options" of a resolution prover in order to cut down the search space. Unlike other approaches of using analogy as that of Greiner 9] , where facts that are neither in the data base nor logically derivable, can be derived by analogy, our treatment of analogy does not enlarge the derivation facilities in principle. Additionally we argue that the description level of concepts and theorems should be as high as possible, as it is much easier then to nd the corresponding level of abstraction where the analogy can be expressed. If the level is too high one can expand the de nitions stepwise without any problem, the reverse operation is much more di cult.
Main Example
In this part we analyze the following simple theorem in detail (taken from 5, p.37]):
Theorem: Let S be a set and and be two equivalence relations on S, then the relation \ is also an equivalence relation.
If we use a sorted rst order logic to formalize the theorem and prove it automatically by a theorem prover as the MKRP system, we may axiomatize it in the following way: Let us use the following abbreviation:
Expanding the de nition of an equivalence relation the theorem can be rewritten as:
We (as well as the MKRP system) see that one can split the proof into the three subproofs:
8 ; : relation P( ; ) =) reflexive( \ ) 8 ; : relation P( ; ) =) symmetric( \ ) 8 ; : relation P( ; ) =) transitive( \ ) These subproofs are independent, so the order of the subproofs is a priori irrelevant. Now it would be a good heuristic to begin proving the \simplest" part of the theorem, namely the re exivity of \ , in order to use this proof to prove the other parts \analogously". Why is this the simplest part? One might argue as a purely syntactic heuristic that the de nition of the re exivity produces only two two-literal clauses whereas symmetry produces a three-literal and two two-literal clauses, and transitivity a four-literal, a three-literal, and a two-literal clause. Consequently it is \easier" to show the re exivity than to show the symmetry, which is itself easier to show than the transitivity, which is by far the most di cult part. If we give the axiomatization of the de nitions and of the rst part of the theorem (the re exivity) to an automated theorem prover, we might obtain the following resolution proof which the MKRP system actually produced (s 1, rel 1 and rel 2 are Skolem constants. The asterisk indicates that the following clause is used in the nal proof). If we analyze this proof, we see that the axioms de ning symmetry and transitivity have not been used, hence we can prove the re exivity of the intersection of two equivalence relations only by using the de nition of intersection and re exivity.
That is instead of 8 ; : relation P( ; ) =) reflexive( \ ) we simply have to prove: 8 ; : relation reflexive( )^reflexive( ) =) reflexive( \ ) This is easier because the original version results in a larger search space. This now is also the decisive step to notice, where we use analogy: we prove the other two parts in the \same" manner, that is, we replace \re exive" by \symmetric" or rather \transitive". So we obtain a general proof plan for the whole proof: Abstractly speaking we use the heuristic: \Prove equal things with equal preconditions." But analyzing the proof of the re exivity property we observe in addition that only terms of depth one occur (no terms of the form ( \ ) \ ). This can also be used as heuristic: \Restrict the term depth to n, if n is the deepest nesting of terms in the proof that is used for the analogy." The use of the last heuristic is more limited, but in this case (where n = 1) it works and causes a drastic improvement in the proof of transitivity. In the following table the number of resolvents in order to nd the proof is shown. As one can see both heuristics together show the best results. In the table \all" means that all three de nitions of re exivity, symmetry and transitivity are given to the theorem prover, \one" means only the necessary one is given, \unbounded" that arbitrary terms may occur, whereas in the case of \depth one" only terms of depth one may occur. Summarizing we see that it is possible to nd powerful heuristics by using analogy. In this case a proof was possible even without domain speci c heuristics, but in more di cult examples this might be no longer the case. Another interesting aspect is that analogy can be used to nd the \preconditions" of a theorem (those axioms that are necessary to prove the theorem). Unlike to the workings of a human mathematician, an automated resolution theorem prover must be told all relevant facts, the so-called preconditions. The theorem prover has then to show the unsatis ability of the facts and the negated theorem. When we started to prove the \re exivity" we used all the de nitions of all occuring concepts as preconditions. We then found a proof and analyzed it and noticed that the de nitions of symmetry and transitivity have not been used. By analogy we concluded that in the other two cases too only the corresponding precondition might be necessary. The heuristics above can also be used to prove the theorem that the intersection of two congruence relations is again a congruence relation 5, p.45], but the savings for the proof of the property that is additionally to be shown are much smaller.
But not only in a neighbourhood as close to the original theorem as these two can we use these heuristics. We can also prove for example the subgroup criterion analogously by using the heuristic \prove equal things with equal preconditions": De ne a subgroup as a subset of a group that is itself a group with respect to the same group operation. We then have the following theorem:
Theorem: Let (G; +) be a group with neutral element 0, inverse function \?" and let S be a subset of G. Then (S; +) is subgroup of (G; 3) 0 2 G 7) inverse(G; +; 0; ?) 4) ? : G ! G Then we can prove group(S; +; 0; ?) by proving these conditions. Therefore we use S G in all seven cases and the corresponding facts of the precondition, i.e. in the case of 1), 5), 6) and 7) no additional information, in the case of 2) the corresponding condition b), in the case of 3) condition a), and in the case of 4) condition c).
As in the example above we can use here the heuristic \show equal things by equal preconditions" and reduce the used preconditions to the necessary ones. This form of analogical reasoning can be used in the proofs of corresponding structures like rings, elds, vector spaces and so on. In all these cases the proofs can be separated into di erent parts, with a similiar reduction of savings in the search space. Unfortunately this is not the whole story, since in a mathematical textbook our theorem would not be phrased as above. For example condition a) would not be mentioned, because it follows from the others. But then our analogy would not be su cient to prove 3).
There are also counterexamples for the heuristic \Show equal things by equal preconditions". Let for example a group be de ned by 1) through 5) above, but instead of 6) and 7) there would be axioms for the existence of a left-neutral element and the existence of left-inverses. Then it is not possible to show property 6) for the substructure using only the existence of a left-neutral element. One needs also the associativity and the existence of left-inverses. From an abstract point of view this is surprising. This proof is therefore more di cult than the other proofs above.
More Examples
In this section we want to sketch some analogies in proofs taken from 5]. All page numbers refer to 5]. A little more di cult than the proof of the previous section is the proof of the following part of a theorem (p.37):
Theorem: Let and be two equivalence relations then the transitive hull of (written ( ) t ) is also an equivalence relation.
As in the proof of our rst example in section 3 this proof can be split into the three subproofs \re exivity", \symmetry", and \transitivity". But here \transitivity" plays a special rôle: It is possible to show that for every relation the relation t is transitive. The proof of the other two parts are then mutually analogous:
Prove the property for the union. Show the invariance of the property under closure.
The next example shows how a special case can catch the whole proof idea.
Theorem: Let fU i : i 2 Ig be a family of subsemi-groups of a semi-group F, then the intersection T i2I U i is also a subsemi-group of F, if the intersection is not empty.
The proof of this theorem (p.9) is given only for the intersection of two semi-groups. The general proof is then analogous to this special case. The analogy consists in the correspondence between \^" and \\" on the one hand and \8i 2 I " and \ T i2I " on the other hand. The two proofs can be sketched as:
Because of its close analogy to this proof, no proof of the next theorem (p.10) is given:
Theorem: Let fU i : i 2 Ig be a family of subgroups of a group F, then the intersection T i2I U i is also a subgroup of F.
Later on an analogous theorem is formulated for families of ideals of a semi-group F (p.22) and proved analogously.
It is a challenge to nd similiar heuristics as shown above also for proofs that are more di cult to nd. Therefore it will probably be necessary to use a hierarchical representation as proposed in 2].
Analogy by an Abstract Description of Proofs
Bundy's idea of proof plans as introduced in 4] may also serve as a metaphor for \proving by analogy": two proofs are analogous if they are instantiations of the same proof plan. Bundy argues that learning from proofs should be possible, that it should be possible to nd a proof by using the successful proof plan of another theorem. In order to do so, it is necessary to nd a basic number of structuring and description facilities that are epistemological su cient to describe proofs and their mutual relationships in order to nd analogies, even in cases that are not as easy as the previous one. Examples from the domain of Real Analysis can be found in 2], where a working system is described, that uses a higher level representation for proofs. Let us look closer at another example: We have the following two \analogous" theorems:
Let A, B and C be sets with addition + and let and be linear functions A ?! B ?! C. Then is linear.
Let A, B and C be topological spaces and let and be continous functions A ?! B ?! C. Then is continous.
The proofs of these theorems can be sketched as: The analogy between concepts that underly the previous example (semi-group, vector space, : : : and topological spaces) resulted later on in the history of mathematics in the de nition of the new concept of an \abelian category", where one can prove formally that certain proofs about rings can be generalized to arbitrary abelian categories 13, p.151].
The most important steps of the proof can be described \declaratively". The hope is that it is possible to classify the theorems and that then the proofs can be found analogously. The two theorems above would belong to a category \property inheritence in case of composition".
Classi cation
Because it can be rather di cult to nd an analogy, it is helpful to have a classi cation of theorems. Taking a closer look at the rst ve paragraphs of 5], one can make the following rough classi cation of theorems (We describe only the rst two categories in more detail):
Invariance: { For the rst category one has the following description (when only two components are considered): P(x)^P(y)^additional conditions =) P(f(x; y)) Such a classi cation could be useful in automated theorem proving, when one has to solve a problem, in the following way:
at rst nd the corresponding category of the problem then nd an \analogous" theorem in this category with a known proof try to transform the proof to the new theorem Sometimes it should be possible to extract a proof schema for the whole category (not to nd a general proof for the whole schema, but as a heuristic). Or it is at least possible to have some heuristic information as in the case of the \invariance"-category the heuristic \prove equal things with equal preconditions". Another such heuristic is Bundy's \Ripple-Out" heuristics 4, p.115].
Analogy and Model
Many mathematical elds as geometry and topology are guided by strong aspects of spatial imagination and live widely on intuition and geometrical views of things. Even in elds where one has no visual models at all, mathematicians try to use the strong visual apparatus of the human mind for an intuition of the constituting concepts and even of proofs. Jacques Hadamard gives an example of a \mental picture" of the proof that there are in nitely many prime numbers 10, p.76]. A more complex example is given by Bartel L. van der Waerden in 19]. We can rephrase this by saying that mathematicians use intuitive models of the objects they deal with whenever possible. These objects are not always real models in the logical sense, more often they are only \near models" or \almost models" (a very lively discussion of this trick can be found in 7, p.112 f.]). The proof is searched for and visualized by means of an example. If the proof is found for the example it is generalized by nding the corresponding analogy and only then is it written down formally.
Many parts of mathematics have been developped by abstracting and generalizing known concepts. For example topology can be regarded as a generalization dealing with open sets and continous functions on the real numbers R. So when trying to nd a general proof in topology one sometimes uses the analogous situation in the case of R or more often in the case of R 2 to nd the general proof. Let us consider a simple theorem (taken from 17, p.19f The interesting thing is that one considers only one special example in order to catch the whole proof. P olya gives in 16] some more examples where the general case is equivalent to the special one. Such an example has to be as easy as possible (in order to be feasible) and as general as necessary (in order to include the whole problem). Now if we have a reasoner for such restricted examples one could then follow this proof of the example as a guiding yardstick in the general case. This could be done just as described above, where one proof is used to guide the search for another by analogy.
Conclusion and Further Work
We presented some examples for the possibility to nd or to facilitate proofs by analogy. The examples suggest an actual formalization such that the idea can be used in an automated theorem proving system. (The examples of the last section seem to be at the moment a little far from actual formalization: this idea is appropriate only in limited cases when an intuition is helpful. The great contribution of formal logic to mathematics however has been to abstract from concrete models and to treat the problem purely formal.) The idea is to nd a whole set of representation facilities for proofs, so that the system can formulate abstract versions of proofs in order to prove other theorems by analogy. This should help in nding the preconditions of a theorem (those clauses that are actually necessary for a proof) and to automatically set certain parameters such as term depth. It also should contribute to the answer of the question \what are the main steps of the proof".
We also notice a semantic aspect: When we draw an analogy from theorems and concepts to analogous proofs we use as a general heuristic that the proof of the generalization follows the same general steps as in the special case. One might argue that this follows from the analogy between the corresponding models. But this whole aspect is only heuristic and there are much more counterexamples than the ones mentioned above. In this paper we have presented a proposal of how to include some aspects of the concept of \analogy" in an automated theorem prover. In order to see whether the proposed ideas are really useful it is necessary to experiment with a much larger set of theorems taken arbitrarily from a mathematical textbook. There are more problems however that have to be solved before we have a useful tool.
